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Federal Tax Law:
The Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code
Manoj Viswanathan1
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code trigger a sudden
increase of tax liability when some attribute of a taxpayer—typically
income—exceeds a particular threshold value. As a result, two
taxpayers in nearly identical economic situations can face
considerably different tax liabilities depending on which side of the
triggering criterion they fall. The magnitude of the equity and
efficiency costs associated with cliff effects is significant: Cliff
effects are attached to tax provisions amounting to hundreds of
billions of dollars, the majority of which targets low- and moderateincome taxpayers. These income-based cliff effects are problematic
on both equity and efficiency grounds because they improperly
penalize taxpayers and disincentivize the economic empowerment
these tax provisions are often intended to promote. These
problematic tax provisions should be replaced by statutes that ensure
that no taxpayer is made worse off post-tax simply by virtue of
earning more income pre-tax.
Why Do Cliff Effects Exist?
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code represent a subset of
the line drawing that occurs with respect to all governmental
regulation. In order to measure, assess, proscribe, or tax behavior,
that behavior must first be identified. This line drawing in the
Internal Revenue Code causes taxpayers close to but on opposite
sides of some triggering criterion to incur varying amounts of tax
liability. When the difference in tax liability is significant, the result
is known as a cliff effect.
These cliff effects exist for a variety of reasons. Some tax
provisions are intended to benefit certain favored groups, such as the
poor, that must be defined. Cliff effects can also be simple
mechanisms by which cost-saving measures can be implemented.

1. Summarized and excerpted from Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden
Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 931
(2016).
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Computationally, the cost of a benefit ending immediately at a
specific income is easier to calculate than a benefit that varies as a
function of income level. Lastly, cliff effects also have political
appeal, in that the benefitting (or punished) group of taxpayers is
more easily identified if the triggering criterion is some specific
number. For instance, Senator Chuck Grassley’s description of the
deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses as “a beneficial
tax incentive for the middle class” was bolstered by fact that the
deduction was eliminated entirely for taxpayers earning more, even
by one dollar, than $80,000.
Identifying Income-Based Cliff Effects
An income-based cliff effect imposes, at some point, a marginal
tax rate of greater than 100%. For example, in 2017 the Earned
Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is eliminated completely for taxpayers
earning more than $3,450 in investment income. If a taxpayer with
two children would otherwise qualify for an EITC of $5,000, earning
$3,451 in investment income would subject this taxpayer to a
marginal tax rate of 500,000%.
Although a cliff effect has implications for income earned
beyond the effect's threshold, a marginal tax rate greater than 100%
exists only at the cliff effect threshold. Assuming the taxpayer in the
above example is in the 15% marginal tax bracket, her next dollar of
investment income after passing the cliff effect would increase her
tax liability by only fifteen cents.
Yet the force of the cliff effect lingers over a much larger range
of income. Assuming the income of the taxpayer in the above
example remains in the 15% bracket, she would need to earn
approximately $5,880 more before she returned to the economic
position she was in prior to the cliff effect. The magnitude of the
impact a cliff effect has on an individual taxpayer, then, must be
analyzed not just by using the marginal tax rate for the first dollar
earned beyond the cliff effect but also by examining how much
additional income the taxpayer would need to earn to offset the
additional tax liability imposed on the taxpayer as a result of the cliff
effect.
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Assessing the Burden of Income-Based Cliff Effects
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code based on a taxpayer’s
income violate principles of equity and efficiency. These tax
provisions implicitly define taxpayers as members either of a lowerincome and benefit-receiving group or of a higher-income and
nonbenefit-receiving group. In theory, this demarcation exists to
accurately advance the goals of the tax provision by limiting the
benefitting recipients to a defined group based on income.
But this categorization of taxpayers by pre-tax income directly
conflicts with the rationale behind the tax provision, resulting in a
flawed implementation of the provision. Separating taxpayers into
these groups pre-tax should result in the low-income and benefitreceiving group being better off. But if a member of the group
receiving benefits is in a better economic position than a member of
the group not receiving benefits, the tax provision will undermine the
objectives of properly classifying taxpayers. As a result of the cliff
effect’s operation and the imposition of a marginal tax rate greater
than 100%, taxpayers barely exceeding the income limit of the cliff
effect will be in a worse economic situation than taxpayers falling
just short of the cliff-effect threshold. The use of cliff effects to
classify taxpayers as eligible or ineligible by reason of income,
therefore, is unfair and inefficient for some number of taxpayers just
beyond the cliff effect.
For every violation of equity, a theoretical minimum dollar
amount exists that can be transferred to the suffering taxpayer to cure
the equity violation. This “equity cost” represents the cost of
modifying a tax provision that is structurally unsound on equity
grounds to a provision that is not. (The term “equity cost,” previously
unrecognized in the literature, is an aggregate microeconomic metric
that represents the net economic loss suffered by all taxpayers who
are in a worse economic situation post-tax than they would have been
had they not exceeded the cliff-effect threshold.) If the cliff effect
creating the equity cost is an income-based cliff effect attached to a
means-tested tax provision, the equity cost represents a flaw in the
implementation of the tax provision. If the tax provision is intended
to benefit a group of taxpayers who are means-tested on a pre-tax
basis by increasing their economic position, the tax provision should
not make these beneficiaries better off than a group of taxpayers
ineligible for the benefit by virtue of earning more. Either the subsidy
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provided by the tax provision is being awarded to taxpayers who do
not need it, or the subsidy is not being provided to those taxpayers
who do. Estimating this “equity cost” is necessary to assess whether
any advantages from the cliff effect with respect to definitional
clarity and simplicity outweigh any costs imposed on the taxpaying
public from the behavioral changes induced and equity violations
created.
The aggregate equity cost of the cliff effects present in the
health-premium-credit provisions of the Affordable Care Act is
approximately $8.5 billion between 2014 and 2024. Although low- to
moderate-income taxpayers are in a better economic position overall
because of the premium credit, the significant equity cost represents
a flaw in the credit’s implementation. The premium credit is intended
to enable low- to moderate-income taxpayers to affordably procure
health insurance for themselves and their families. But the premium
credit, at two levels of income eligibility, makes certain taxpayers
worse off post-tax than these taxpayers would have been had they
earned less income pre-tax. Such a result undermines the normative
justifications for the premium credit’s existence.
Proposals for Change
To assess the validity of a cliff effect, the goals of the tax
provision to which the cliff effect is attached must be determined.
The benefits provided by the cliff effect should be compared to
alternative scenarios in which the cliff effect is replaced by a benefitlimiting substitute that does not impose a marginal tax rate greater
than 100%. Of critical importance is determining the extent to which
the cliff effect advances the stated goal of the tax provision and at
what cost.
Any cliff effect based on income imposing costs greater than any
social utility it creates can be eliminated by phasing out the benefit
over a span of income starting either before or at the cliff-effect
threshold rather than eliminating the benefit entirely. However, using
a phase-out results in either a greater total cost of the benefit or a
reduction in benefits to some recipients. Although taxpayers will not
be subjected to a cliff effect, some taxpayers will be worse off than
they were with the cliff effect in place. Cliff effects based on income
imposing costs greater than the social utility they create can be
replaced with phase-outs imposing marginal tax rates of less than
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100%. Where the phase-out should begin and end depends on the
social utility of the tax provision in question at the cliff-effect
threshold, and on whether or not the modification should be revenue
neutral.
Any solution to mitigate the harsh consequences of cliff effects
must not harm taxpayers any more than the cliff effect it is replacing.
Taxpayers can be protected from suffering the equity cost of the cliff
effect by awarding each affected taxpayer a credit to bring her posttax economic position to the maximum level it would have been had
she earned less income. Consider, for example, a taxpayer who loses
a $1,000 tax benefit once her income reaches $20,000. If this
taxpayer’s income is $20,400 and the income beyond $20,000 is
taxed at 25%, she is economically worse off by $700 by earning the
extra $400 beyond the $20,000 cliff effect. A $700 credit would
compensate the taxpayer for the burden of the cliff effect.
Another way to ensure taxpayers are not economically worse off
post-tax from earning additional income is to ensure that taxpayers
will not endure marginal tax rates greater than some fixed
percentage. Even if every cliff effect were converted into a phaseout, taxpayers may still experience high marginal tax rates for
income earned beyond the eliminated cliff effect. The phase-out
range for one tax expenditure could overlap with the phase-out range
of another. This can result in a marginal tax rate greater than 100%
even though the phase-out percentages of each individual tax
provision are less than 100%. A solution to this issue is to limit the
maximum marginal tax rate that a taxpayer must face. The phase-out
rates for various provisions would, in effect, not be constant but
would vary according to an individual’s particular marginal tax rate
profile. If, for example, this maximum marginal tax rate were 40%, a
taxpayer would be assured that any additional income earned would
increase her net economic position by at least 60% of the additional
income earned.
Conclusion
When triggered by a taxpayer's income, cliff effects necessarily
leave some taxpayers in a worse economic position than if they had
earned less. When the costs associated with cliff effects outweigh the
gains obtained from the simplicity of bright-line rules, tax provisions
should be rewritten to eliminate the cliff effect. Of special note is a
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guarantee that no taxpayer is made worse off post-tax simply by
virtue of earning more pre-tax income.
This analysis focuses on cliff effects in the Internal Revenue
Code but has implications on cliff effects found in state and local
direct-transfer programs as well. Similar to cliff effects in the
Internal Revenue Code, the simplicity gains obtained from cliff
effects associated with state and local tax regimes and direct-transfer
programs should be compared to the burdens imposed on taxpayers
whose benefits are suddenly terminated.
Cliff effects, even if designed to precisely define terms requiring
clarity and promoting some desired behavior, should be used
cautiously. Their use often undermines the intent of the statutes to
which they are attached. The proposals set forth herein to assess,
measure, and remedy existing and proposed cliff effects are a step
towards improving the equity and efficiency of benefits provided in
the Internal Revenue Code, state and local tax regimes, and directtransfer programs.

